Q: What was the holding and the rule of Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)?
Holding: 14th Amend was race specific. Its one purpose was the freedom of slaves, and the establishment & protection of that freedom. Distinguished b/w US citizenship & State citizenship (based on the first sentence of 14th Amend). Fundamental civil rights (like this one) are domain of states. The rights of US citizenship could not be infringed upon by states.
RULE: This case stands for the proposition that (1) the right to pursue lawful occupation is not a privilege and immunity that an article III court can hold that a state must recognize and protect where the state has not undertaken to recognize and protect such a right. (2) The Fourteenth Amendment cannot be construed to provide a fundamental right to pursue occupation, without obstacles to pursuit of occupation is not deprivation of property right that is a fundamental right. (3) The 14th Amendment was intended to account for the freedom of the slaves, but it does not only apply to Negroes.
What's Your Answer to "What was the holding and the rule of Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)?"
Are you a lawyer? Or, do you just knoooow the answer?
We have located some similar legal questions and legal question categories. Check out these challenging questions that askquestions about Supreme Court Cases and are similar to What was the holding and the rule of Slaughterhouse Cases (1873)?. Also, we have included a list of some of our more popular legal question categories. These categories are based on what everyone is asking and answering.
Similar Legal Questions
- What are the rights framed by Corfield v. Coryell (1823)?
- What are the P&Is of state citizenship under 5th am?
- Slaughterhouse Cases
- What does Gitlow say regarding the First Amendment?
- What are the privileges and immunities of citizenship?
- Dred Scott v. Sanford
- State the Privileges & Immunities clause as proposed by Harlan.
- What are the fundamental rights of the due process?
- Explain Substantive DP-
- What are the specific constitutional rights in Substantiative Due Process?
A: Dan Goodman's Answer
In the Slaughterhouse Cases, the Supreme Court held, one, that citizenship of a State was separate and distinct from citizenship of the United States; that a citizen of a State was separate and distinct from a citizen of the United States:
“Of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States, and of the privileges and immunities of the citizen of the State, and what they respective are, we will presently consider; but we wish to state here that it is only the former which are placed by this clause (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment) under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the latter, whatever they may be, are not intended to have any additional protection by this paragraph of the amendment.” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74 (1873).
In addition:
“In the Slaughter-house cases, 16 Wall. 36, the subject of the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of a particular State, was treated by Mr. Justice Miller in delivering the opinion of the court. He stated . . . that it was only privileges and immunities of the citizen of the United States that were placed by the [Fourteenth] amendment under the protection of the Federal Constitution, and that the privileges and immunities of a citizen of a State, whatever they might be, were not intended to have any additional protection by the paragraph in question, but they must rest for their security and protection where they have heretofore rested.” Maxwell v. Dow: 176 U.S. 581, at 587 (1900).
And:
“. . . It is, then, to the Fourteenth Amendment that the advocates of the congressional act must resort to find authority for its enactment, and to the first section of that amendment, which is as follows: ‘All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States, and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States, nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process of law, nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.’
In the first clause of this section, declaring who are citizens of the United States, there is nothing which touches the subject under consideration. The second clause, declaring that ‘no State shall make or enforce any law which will abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States,’ is limited, according to the decision of this court in Slaughter-House Cases, to such privileges and immunities as belong to citizens of the United States, as distinguished from those of citizens of the State.” Neal v. State of Delaware: 103 U.S. 370, at 406 (1880).
So now there is a citizen of a State and there is a citizen of the United States:
” . . . There is no inherent right in a citizen to thus sell intoxicating liquors by retail. It is not a privilege of a citizen of the State or of a citizen of the United States.” Crowley v. Christensen: 137 U.S. 86, at 91 (1890).
” . . . In the Constitution and laws of the United States, the word ‘citizen’ is generally, if not always, used in a political sense to designate one who has the rights and privileges of a citizen of a State or of the United States.” Baldwin v. Franks: 120 U.S. 678, at 690 (1887).
The Supreme Court, in the Slaughterhouse Cases, also held, that there are now two citizens under the Constitution of the United States of America, a citizen of the United States, at Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, and also a citizen of the several States, at Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution:
“We think this distinction and its explicit recognition in this amendment of great weight in this argument, because the next paragraph of this same section (Section 1, Clause 2 of the Fourteenth Amendment), which is the one mainly relied on by the plaintiffs in error, speaks ONLY of privileges and immunities of citizens of the United States, and does not speak of those (privileges and immunities) of citizens of the several States. . . . .
The first occurrence of the words ‘privileges and immunities’ in our constitutional history, is to be found in the fourth of the articles of the old Confederation. . . .
In the Constitution of the United States, which superseded the Articles of Confederation, the corresponding provision is found in section two of the fourth article, in the following words: ‘The citizens of each State shall be entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens OF the several States.’ ” Slaughterhouse Cases: 83 U.S. (16 Wall.) 36, at 74, 75 (1873).
Further:
“In speaking of the meaning of the phrase ‘privileges and immunities of citizens OF the several States,’ under section second, article fourth, of the Constitution, it was said by the present Chief Justice, in Cole v. Cunningham, 133 U.S. 107, that the intention was ‘to confer on the citizens of the several States a GENERAL CITIZENSHIP, and to communicate all the privileges and immunities which the citizens of the same State would be entitled to under the like circumstances, and this includes the right to institute actions.’ ” Maxwell v. Dow: 176 U.S. 581, at 592 (1900).
Therefore, there is a citizen of the United States, under Section 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment and also a citizen of the several States, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution of the United States of America.
A citizen of the United States, under Section 1 Clause 1 of the Fourteenth Amendment, can become also a citizen of a State. A citizen of the several States is also a citizen of a State, under Article IV, Section 2, Clause 1 of the Constitution (“the citizens of each State”), or; in other words, a citizen of a State, who is not a citizen of the United States, is entitled to privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States:
“There can be no doubt that Balk, as a citizen of the State of North Carolina, had the right to sue Harris in Maryland to recover the debt which Harris owed him. Being a citizen of North Carolina, he was entitled to all the privileges and immunities of citizens of the several States, one of which is the right to institute actions in the courts of another State.” Harris v. Balk: 198 U.S. 215, at 223 (1905).
“. . . So, a State may, by rule uniform in its operation as to citizens of the several States, require residence within its limits for a given time before a citizen of another State who becomes a resident thereof shall exercise the right of suffrage or become eligible to office. It has never been supposed that regulations of that character materially interfered with the enjoyment by citizens of each State of the privileges and immunities secured by the Constitution to citizens of the several States. The Constitution forbids only such legislation affecting citizens of the respective States as will substantially or practically put a citizen of one State in a condition of alienage when he is within or when he removes to another State, or when asserting in another State the rights that commonly appertain to those who are part of the political community known as the People of the United States, by and for whom the Government of the Union was ordained and established. Blake v. McClung: 172 US. 239, at 256 thru 257 (1898).
The rule from the Slaughterhouse Cases is that a particular State has police powers to regulate those lawful trades and business to insure the safety of its citizens. See also Crowley v. Christensen, 137 U.S. 86, at 91 (1890), (“The police power of the State is fully competent to regulate the business [of selling intoxicating liquors by retail]“).
* * * * * * *