Majority opinion
a.    No, neither statute violate the First Am.  Brennan, writing
for the majority, confirmed what Chaplinsky had suggested—that
“obscenity is not within the area of constitutionally protected
speech or press.”  But the Court also held that First Amendment
concerns limit the acceptable definition of “obscenity” (and the
federal statute met this limit).
b.    The Court formulated its own definition of “obscenity”:
Whether to the average person, applying contemporary community
standards, the dominant theme of the material taken as a whole
appeals to prurient interest.  The Court purported to be repeating
the definition of obscenity laid down in certain prior lower-court
cases. However, the definition seems to have been intended as a
minimal constitutional standard; that is, the state could not,
consistent with the First Amendment, ban a given item as obscene
unless it satisfied Roth definition “obscenity.”
1.  Note the major difference between the Roth test and Hicklen is
that Roth test takes into account “the dominant theme of the material
taken as a whole,” thus preventing an entire work (i.e., Leaves of
Grass) from being banned just because of a few “obscene” passages.
Another major difference is that the “average person” is the standard
in Roth, while “the most susceptible person” was the standard in
Hicklin.
2.  If a work had some serious social value (e.g., of a literary
nature),
but its dominant theme was nonetheless one which “excites lustful
thoughts” and is therefore “prurient,” it is simply not clear whether
the material could be obscene under Roth (Harlan seems to think it
would fail).
c.    What does “prurient” mean?  The Court defined “prurient” as
“material having a tendency to excite lustful thoughts.”  Brennan
said this was no different than the ALI def.
1.    But Dave says Brennan is wrong!  On p. 770, the ALI report
clearly does not take into account tendency.  Note how the Court’s
definition of “prurient” has the Holmesian “bad tendency” element.