a.    The maj. did not adequately deal with the conflict between the Free Exercise Clause and the Establishment Clause.

b.    The maj.’s decision is not consistent with Braunfeld.  There was not a less direct burden on free exercise in that case than in this case.
The impact on P’s religion in this case is much less onerous than in Braunfeld.  Even upon the unlikely assumption that P could not find suitable non-Saturday employment, she will at worst receive employment compensation for 22 weeks.  But “I agree with the Court’s decision…that the possibility of that denial is enough to infringe on P’s constitutional right to the free exercise of her religion.”  To reach this result, though, the Court must explicitly overrule Braunfeld, which it should do.

1.  Dave agrees with Stewart’s view on Braunfeld (it seems to square with Dave’s cost-benefit approach above).